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Opinion Dynamics lacks a theoretical basis. In this article, I propose to use a decision-
theoretic framework, based on the updating of subjective probabilities, as that basis.
We will see we get a basic tool for a better understanding of the interaction between
the agents in Opinion Dynamics problems and for creating new models. I will review
the few existing applications of Bayesian update rules to both discrete and continuous
opinion problems and show that several traditional models can be obtained as special
cases or approximations from these Bayesian models. The empirical basis and useful
properties of the framework will be discussed and examples of how the framework
can be used to describe different problems given.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Opinion Dynamics1–7 modeling lacks a clear theoretical basis. One unifying proposal
exists for discrete opinion models8, but it does not include continuous opinions. A unifying
framework should be able to both help us create new descriptions of new circumstances as
well as, if possible, shed some light on the meaning of the already existing models. Ideally, a
framework similar to that represented by Lagrangeans in Classical Mechanics, in the sense
of allowing different circumstances of the world to be described within the framework, would
be an important contribution to the area. Different models try to explain different aspects
of the way people influence each other’s opinions, often, with no common ground. While it
is true that the area has observed a number of first successes in predicting a few events9,10, it
still lacks more testing. Models, while ingenious, are typically proposed in an ad hoc basis.
Here, we will see that Bayesian inference can be used as a basis to develop a general
framework for the updating of the opinions of agents. By clearly defining what is being
discussed, how communication happens, and how likely each agent considers its neighbors
to know something about the problem, Bayesian rules can be used to create models that
incorporate all these features, sometimes into a simple model. We will see that the formalism
is general in the sense that an update rule will always be obtained, once the relevant functions
are defined, meaning that the formalism is actually quite general. And, by its dependence
on the communication process, it will also allow us to better understand the meaning of
traditional models.
Bayesian updating rules have been used before, both for discrete models, in the Contin-
uous Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA) model11,12 as well as for continuous models13.
The CODA model allowed the observation of emergence of extremism, even when no ex-
tremist agents were observed initially. It will be briefly reviewed here as an example of
the application of Bayesian update rules and I will demonstrate that it can be seen as a
general case for discrete model, that are recovered as one specific limit of the model. For
the purely continuous problem, where agents tell their full continuous opinion to each other
will be studied here, Bayesian update models13 recovered the qualitative results of Bounded
Confidence models6,7 and allowed an extension where the threshold-equivalent variable is
updated and stubbornness emerges as a consequence of the model.
The qualities of this framework will be discussed, also as a possible heuristic approxima-
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tion to rational behavior. We will show that this framework can have consequences outside
pure update rules, like an easier way to treat decisions and not only opinions or with a
natural definition of a network in the continuous update variable problem. We will see that
a variation of the CODA model can be seen as a general case of discrete update rules, when
a specific limit is taken. And, finally, the power of using Bayesian methods will be illus-
trated with two applications: one where the opinions lead to the breakdown of a network of
trust, and another where an analysis of a case where agents share the full strength of their
probabilistic opinion about a discrete choice is performed.
II. BAYESIAN UPDATE MODELS: THE FRAMEWORK
When people debate any issue they are interested about, the opinion of the other part
can be considered as information about what choice is most likely to be best. Opinion
Dynamics models are based on that assumption, as they use rules where each agent can
change its opinion by the interaction with other agents. However, in general, often for
the sake of simplicity, they fail to recognize the difference between internal and observed
opinions. And yet, even if people were completely honest about their opinions, our language
and observations certainly don’t match our personal opinions. Discrete models generally
opinions with no strength attached to them, while Bounded Confidence models have the
agents express their correct opinions as an exact number. It is clear, however, that human
language is not as precise as exact numbers14.
This distinction between internal and stated opinion can certainly have consequences for
the dynamics of the system. However, at first, it might not be clear how to deal with such a
distinction. While there are normative rules about how people should change their opinions
in face of new information15–18, early laboratory experiments seem to show that people
violate strongly those rules19–22 . On the other hand, more recent analysis seem to indicate
that people are not as incompetent as those experiments seem to indicate, but actually use
smart heuristics to solve their everyday problems23–25. In the case of probabilistic decisions,
our heuristics can be understood as an approximation to a Bayesian inference26 and it was
also observed that our inductive reasoning resemble Bayesian reasoning closely27. Therefore,
it makes sense to use Bayesian updating as a basis for Opinion Dynamics models. That is
so in the sense that there is some empirical evidence that, although Bayesian reasoning
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won’t provide a perfect description of the microscopic interactions, it will give us a good
approximation.
This means that one can develop Opinion Dynamics models by following simple rules,
and those models can be adapted to different situations and scenarios. A simple recipe exists
for any such kind of models, that is presented here as a series of steps to be followed:
1. Identify what is the real debated issue that the model should represent and assign a
variable x to that issue. A choice between different ideas or theories is a discrete choice
and, therefore, x should be, in this case, a discrete variable. If the debate is about
establishing the value of a continuous variable, x should be that continuous variable
that the agents are talking about. Regardless of the case, the objective of each agent
is to improve its inference about x.
2. In order to build a Bayesian model, each agent i needs to have a subjective opinion
about x, represented by a probability distribution fi(x) that indicates agent i belief
on how likely each possible value of x is.
3. communication does not necessarily means stating a value for x. Notice that each
agent has a full distribution in its mind and a complete description of his state of
knowledge is given only by the distribution fi(x). Therefore, the modeler must decide
how to represent the communication process. communication can be as simple as
observing a choice between two alternatives by the neighbor j, where j simply chooses
the alternative with larger probability of being correct11. Or the agents can give some
point estimate for x∗, per example, the average E[X ], obtained from the distribution
fi(x)
13. By definition, communication means the statement of a numeric value Aj
by agent j, such that Aj [f ] is some functional of fj(x). In principle, agent j could
communicate more than one value and, in this case, Aj would be a vector.
4. The agents must have in their minds a relationship between the true value of x, x∗
and the stated value Aj , given by a probability distribution p(Aj|x
∗). That is, given
that a possible value x∗ is the correct value, what is the chance the neighbor j will
comunicate Aj . This model can be as simple as a fixed probability, as we will see in
Section IIIA, or as complex as a full evaluation of the inference process of j as the
modeler wishes.
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5. The probability distribution p(Aj |x) plays the role of a likelihood of the observation
Aj . Since agent i already had a prior opinion fi(x), obtaining its posterior opinion
fi(x|Aj) is a simple task of applying Bayes Theorem
17. The posterior becomes the
new opinion of i and its stated values must be recalculated as Ai[fi(x|Aj)].
6. Define who interact with whom and how often.
In order to better understand this framework and illustrate it, two already existing
Bayesian Opinion Dynamics models will be discussed bellow. They are the Continuous
Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA) model11,12 and a model where communication is
made by the use of a continuous variable13, as in Bounded Confidence models. We will also
see how they relate to more traditional models.
III. TRADITIONAL EXISTING MODELS AND BAYESIAN VERSION
A. Discrete Opinions and the CODA Model
In the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA) model11,12, each agent i is
trying to decide between two conflicting options. That is, x is a discrete variable with only
two possible values, assumed here to be ±1. This means that the subjective opinion fi(x)
can be trivially described as fi(+1) = pi and, therefore, fi(−1) = 1−pi . The communication
between agents only involve stating which choice is preferred by the agent. That is, what
is observed is as spin si, given by si = Ai[f ] = sign(pi − 0.5). Finally, the likelihood
can be chosen in the simpler possible way, that is, each agent considers there is a chance
p(sj = +1|x = +1) = a > 0.5. That is, everyone assigns the same fixed chance a greater
than 50% that a neighbor will choose the best alternative.
With the introduction of a social network that specifies who can be influenced by whom,
the model is ready. Of course, changes of variable are often useful. This model is much
simpler when we work with the log-odds ν in favor of +1, defined as νi = ln(
pi
1−pi ). Bayes
Theorem causes a change in pi that translate to a simple additive process in νi. That is, if
the neighbor supports +1, νi changes to νi+α, where α = ln(
a
1−a); if the neighbor supports
−1, νi changes to νi − α. That is, the model is a simple additive biased random walk, with
the bias dependent on the choice of the neighbors of each agent.
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When the spatial structure is introduced, simulations have shown11,12 that the emerging
consensus is only local. Neighborhoods that support one idea will reinforce themselves and,
with time, most of the agents become more and surer of their opinions, to the point they can
be described as extremists. This happens even when all the agents had moderate opinions
as initial conditions, unlike other models, where extremists have to be artificially introduced
from the beginning. One should notice that the underlying continuous opinion allows us to
speak of strength of opinions, unlike typical discrete models and, as such, at first, it is not
so clear how CODA relates to those models.
When analyzed using the framework, it is clear how one can generalize CODA model to
different scenarios. Per example, by modeling a situation where α 6= β and β is a function of
time, it was possible to obtain a diffusive process from the CODA model where the diffusion
slows down with time until it freezes28, with clear applications in the spread of new ideas
or products. By modelling the influence of Nature as a bias in the social process of Science,
CODA also proved useful to improve the understanding of how scientific knowledge might
change29.
As an extension of the model, we can assume that the likelihoods depend not only on
the opinion of the neighbor, but also on the agent’s own observed choice. This is equivalent
to introducing in the agent some awareness that its neighbor’s choices might be dependent
not only on the best choices, but could also be a reflection of its own influence upon that
neighbor. For calculation purposes, assume, without lack of generality, that the first agent
choice is si = +1. That is, the likelihood P (sj = +1|x = 1) is replaced by two different
probabilities
a = P (sj = +1|x = +1, si = +1) 6= P (sj = +1|x = +1, si = −1) = c (1)
and P (sj = −1|x = −1) is replaced by
b = P (sj = −1|x = −1, si = −1) 6= P (sj = −1|x = −1, si = +1) = d. (2)
Solving the Bayes Theorem and calculating the log-odds of the opinion, if the neighbor
agrees (si = +1), we have
ν(t + 1) = ν(t) + ln
(
a
1− d
)
, (3)
and, if there is disagreement,
ν(t + 1) = ν(t) + ln
(
1− a
d
)
. (4)
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The steps will only be equal in modulus, aside different signs, if a = d. This corresponds to
the situation where both x = +1 and x = −1 are equally strong in influencing the agents
and the agent i choice is considered irrelevant for the choice of its neighbor j. On the other
hand, if the agent i considers that, when si = +1, it is more likely that a neighbor will
choose sj = +1, than we must have a > d. In this case, the steps will not have the same
value and disagreement will have a more important impact than agreement.
The case where a → 1 is interesting. If a = 1 exactly, agent i expects that, whenever it
chooses a and x = +1 is actually the best choice, the neighbor j will also choose x = +1
with certainty. That means that an observation of sj = +1 carries no new information, while
sj = −1 would actually prove that x = +1 can not be the better choice. What happens is
that, when a = 1, the problem is no longer probabilistic, but one of Classical Logic. And
as soon as the agent observes both decisions on its neighbors, it is faced with an unsolvable
contradiction, unless a is not exactly 1, but only close to. That is, we can work with the
limit a→ 1, but a should actually never be exactly 1.
Calculating the limits of the steps in Equations 3 and 4, we have, for the agreement case,
lim
a→1
(
ln
(
a
1− d
))
= L, (5)
where L is finite and non-zero. For disagreement, on the other hand, we have
lim
a→1
(
ln
(
1− a
d
))
→ −∞. (6)
That is, agreement will tend to cause a negligible change to the value of ν, when compared
with the change caused by disagreement. If all agents start with reasonably moderate
opinions, so that, whenever they find disagreement, their choices will flip, the system, in the
a → 1 case is a simple one. Whenever the neighbor agrees, the first agent will not update
its opinion (or update very little, if a is not exactly 1). When the neighbor disagrees, the
first agent will change its observed opinion to that of the neighbor. In other words, when
agent i observes agent j choice, it always end with the same choice as j. In the limit, we
obtain the traditional voter model30,31.
That is, we have a dynamics where the agent only updates its mind when there is disagree-
ment. This same update dynamics is observed in other discrete models, as per example, for
Sznajd interactions4,5,32. In Sznajd model, it takes two agreeing agents to convince all other
neighbors. Basically, it works the same way as the voter model, except for the description
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of when an interaction happens. Since the Bayesian framework is only applied here to the
opinion update and not to the rules of interaction, we have the same case as we had in the
voter model. Other features, such as contrarians10, are also easily introduced by a simple
change in the likelihood. If an agent considers its neighbor more likely to be wrong than
correct, the agent opinion will change away from that of the neighbor, hence, a contrarian33.
Finally, the models of hierarchical voting34,35, where the decision of each level is obtained
from the majority of the voters, except when there is a tie, can also be easily translated
into CODA Bayesian language using the same strategy as in the voter model. That is,
agreement with the majority means no reinforcing of previous opinion, while disagreement
leads to an observable change. If there is a slightly different likelihood in favor of one
theory, when there is a tie, that theory will tend to be picked up. The same effect could also
happen due to small differences in the probabilistic continuous views of the individuals in
the tie groups. Interestingly, the translation of the problem into CODA formalism suggests
natural extensions of the model, where the final opinion might depend also on the continuous
probability each agent assigns to each proposition.
B. Continuous Variables
We can also investigate the relation between the framework and the Bounded Confidence
continuous opinion models6,7. That relation was studied in a previous work13 and, for the
sake of completude, it is reviewed here, as that Bayesian model will be extended in the next
Section.
In this case, the agents want to learn the value of a continuous variable θ, that plays the
part of x in the framework description. Each agent i has a continuous prior opinion about
a variable θ, represented by a prior distribution fi(θ), with an average estimate of θ given
by xi = E[Θ]. Here the average xi is the value that is communicated to the other agents.
Assume also the prior is a Normal distribution with uncertainty σi. As the idea was to get a
model comparable to Bounded Confidence models, it is necessary to introduce a likelihood
that is a mixture of the Normal distribution (probability p), with the same uncertainty the
agent assigns to his own prior, and a Uniform distribution over the whole range of possible
values.
f(xj|θ) = pN(θ, σ
2
j ) + (1− p)U(0, 1), (7)
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That is, the agent thinks that the other agent might know something (Normal around
the true value, with probability p) or know nothing, just stating a completely random guess
(Uniform, 1− p). Using these rules the new average, after interacting with agent j will be
xi(t+ 1) = p
∗xi(t) + xj(t)
2
+ (1− p∗)xi(t) (8)
where
p∗ =
p 1√
2piσi
e
− (xi(t)−xj(t))
2
2σ2
i
p 1√
2piσi
e
− (xi(t)−xj(t))
2
2σ2
i + (1− p)
. (9)
Assuming only the average estimate xi is updated, instead of the whole distribution, this
generates a model with all the qualitative features of Bounded Confidence models. If one
approximates Equation 9 by a step function, we actually do recover Bounded Confidence
exactly.
Of course, better updatings, from the point of view of rationality, are possible. Ideally,
each agent should update the whole probability distribution, but one natural next step is
simply to add the updating of the second moment of the distribution (that way, one can
still have Normal distributions at every step). We have then
σ2i (t+ 1) = σ
2
i (t)
(
1−
p∗
2
)
+ p∗(1− p∗)
(
xi(t)− xj(t)
2
)2
. (10)
Now the agents have a dynamics for their uncertainty and it is observed that they become
more stubborn with time. This extra updating allows us to notice another interesting
property of Bayesian rules. Since each parameter has a clear interpretation, it is easier to
propose natural extensions of the model. We will return to this model and propose a simple
new extension to better illustrate this in Section VA.
C. Rationality and Bayesian rules
A comment on the possibility of modeling rational agents is needed here. It is true that
Bayesian update rules provide a way to model how agents change their minds. However,
it is important to notice that the agents described here are not completely rational. Full
rationality would imply much more than just using Bayes Theorem to update subjective
probabilities. One of the most simple and important characteristics one expects from full
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theoretical rationality is that a rational individual should analyze all information available
as well as possible. And that is not done by the agents in any of the models discussed here.
Agents in the models presented here use heuristics, just as humans are believed to do24.
Alse, some values were assumed as known without uncertainty, as the chance a that a
neighbor will favor the best hypothesis. In a real problem, a rational agent must also solve
the problem of testing different likelihoods. A rational agent should also model the way the
neighbors makes up their minds. That would include how each neighbor is influenced by
its own neighbors, including the original agent. Such model would require a model about
how the neighbor supposes the first agent decides the best option and, if the neighbor were
also rational, that would include the agent having to model how the neighbor models the
opinions of the agent. Approximations to full rationality are needed. But they are needed
for humans to reason also, as our cognitive ability is not infinite. And simple Bayesian
updating rules can suggest new rules as well as alterations in the models, if one deems them
necessary. They also help explain known results better, as we have seen in Section II.
IV. USING THE FRAMEWORK
In other to explore the power of the proposed framework better, two toy models will be
discussed bellow that are alterations of the continuous model and of the CODA model.
V. EXAMPLES
A. Networks
Equation 9 is, as written and used in the continuous opinion model, just a step in calculat-
ing the new average. However, it refers to how trustworthy the agents think the other agents
are. If agents not only change their minds about the variable they want to learn about, but
also keep the information about the trustworthiness of each agent they have interacted with,
we will have a pij that evolves with time and that represents what each agent i thinks of
the others. This is, a network of trust will evolve. For this model, simulations show that
updating that value introduces no significant quantitative differences in the outcome of the
model when only final opinion is analysed. We see that the trust network splits into the
same number of values of final opinions, for a given choice of σi, with pij = 0 trust between
10
agents with different final values of x and with pij = 1 for agents with the same opinion.
The reason that the updating of pij has negligible influence in the final opinion distribution
is that pij has a much weaker in the update in Equation 9 than the effect one obtains from
different values of σi.
Pajek
Figure 1. Network of trust after final split of opinions for N = 40 agents. The initial uncertainty
of every agent was σi = 0.06
This updated trust by use of Equation 9 can be a basis for the evolution of the network
of trust. If each agent has an individual opinion about the probability each one of the other
agents knows what they are talking about, p must be replaced by the field opinion pij agent
i has about the correctness of agent j. By keeping track of these values and updating them
at each interaction, Equation 9 provides the dynamics for pij. Since pij measures the trust
between the agents, it is natural to understand it as a natural measure for a network of trust
in the system.
Figure 1 shows the final network for the case where N = 40 agents were left to interact,
from an initial uncertainty of σi = 0.06. Visualization was performed with the use of
the Pajek software36, using the Fruchterman–Reingold energy routine37. The spread of the
opinions in the simulations was basically the same as that previously obtained with no update
in pij. Basically, pij introduces a linear distrust, while the effects from a small value of σi
are felt as the tails of a Normal distribution and, therefore, far stronger. That is consistent
with previous analysis of the model13. What is interesting to notice is the complete split of
the network into two unconnected parts, corresponding to the two different final opinions.
Within each unconnected portion, agents trust each other with probability p =, and they
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all distrust those with different choices, so that p = 0 in those cases. We can also see how
the fact that we understand the meaning of the variables in the Bayesian framework has
allowed us to propose a natural extension of the model.
B. Discrete Choices with Continuous Verbalization
Finally, in order to better explore the formalism and also in order to make some of its
properties clearer, a variant of the CODA model will be discussed where the communication
between the agents is not a discrete spin value, but the full probability pi agent i assigns to
the possibility that the right choice is x = +1. Notice that the fact that the communication
is continuous does no imply that x should be. We still have a problem with only two
possible choices x = ±1. However, the continuous probabilistic value is the communicated
information. This distinction is a very important albeit neglected one. In continuous models,
it is usually assumed that both the communication and the decision are continuous, but that
doesn’t have to be the case.
As the communication phase in the framework was changed, we need now a new likeli-
hood, that neighbor agent j will issue the value pj in the case where x = −1 and in the case
where x = +1, that is, functions f(pj|A) and f(pj|B). Since all values for pi are limited to
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, the simplest choice is to take Beta distributions Be(pj |α, β) as priors.
Be(pj |α, β) =
1
B(α, β)
pα−1j (1− pj)
β−1
where B(α, β) is obtained from Gamma functions by
B(α, β) =
Γ(α)Γ(β)
Γ(α+ β))
.
The Beta distribution is the prior conjugate distribution to a Binomial likelihood. That
means that α is associated with the observed number of successes in a Binomial trial and β
with the number of failures. This translates in the fact that, if an agent thinks that pi > 0.5,
we must have αi > βi, as well as αi < βi pi < 0.5.
As Beta function is symmetric in α e β, if we want to keep the symmetry between
x = +1 and x = −1, we must have for the likelihoods that, if f(pj|x = 1) = B(α, β), then
f(pj|x = −1) = B(β, α). It is also reasonable to assume that, under uncertainty conditions,
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it is likely that the neighbors will get a wrong answer, that is, the likelihoods shouldn’t be
too different. This can be achieved by making alpha and beta not too different, per example,
α = β + 1. By applying the Bayes Theorem to this problem, agent i, when observing pj,
will update pi to pi(t+ 1),
pi(t+ 1) =
pipj
pipj + (1− pi)(1− pj)
. (11)
The normalization factors of each term cancel out and Equation 11 is exact. Furthermore, if
we adopt the same transformation of variables as in CODA model and estimate pi/(1− pi)
we will see that the denominators also cancel and we have that
ln(
pi(t+ 1)
1− pi(t+ 1)
) = ln(
pi(t)
1− pi(t)
) + ln(
pj(t)
1− pj(t)
) (12)
Defining νi = ln(p/(1− p)), Equation 12 can be rewritten in a more elegant fashion
νi(t+ 1) = νi(t) + νj (13)
This is similar to the CODA dynamics, except that now, at each step, instead of adding
a term that is constant in size and only varies in sign, we add exactly the log-oods of the
opinion of the neighbor.
Equation 11 allows us to search for solutions that are fixed points, what happens when
pi(t+1) = pi(t).By replacing this condition in Equation 11 we have the stable fixed solutions
pi = 0 ou pi = 1 for every i. There is also another trivial solution pj = 0.5 for every i, but
this solution is not stable. This seems to indicate that the system will tend to the extreme
values, in opposition to the models where both verbalization and decision were continuous.
These are the same stable points we had in CODA, but in the original model, the system
was prevented from ever reaching them, except locally.
Simulations were prepared to confirm this prediction. Square lattices with periodic
boundary conditions and von Neumann neighborhood were used and the state of the system
observed after different average number of interactions t per agent. The results for the evo-
lution of the configurations of choices can be seen in Figure 2. At first, we observe a behavior
very similar to that of the CODA model, with a clear appearance of domains with different
choices. However, instead of freezing, those domains keep changing and expanding and,
eventually, one of the options emerge as victorious and the system arrives at a consensus.
Figure 3 shows histograms with the observed distributions for νi, equivalent to each of
the cases in Figure 2. The important thing to notice there is how the scale of typical values
13
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Figure 2. Typical lattice configuration showing the choices after t interactions per agent.
for νi changes with time. In the original CODA model, the extremist peaks corresponded to
νi around −430 (that is, 500 steps with the size of the step determined by a = 70%). That
value was already quite extreme since it corresponded to probabilities of around 10−300.
Meanwhile the values of 10215 observed at Figure 3 are νi values, and not probability pi
values. That means that opinions are incredibly extreme. The system as a whole observes a
surprisingly fast appearance of extremist. After as little as 5 average interactions per agents,
we have opinions so extreme that would take 100 CODA model interactions.
What is happening here is that, as νi gets large by the same local reinforcement process
as in CODA, this causes larger values of νj to be added in Equation 13. And those ever
increasing extreme opinions eventually reach the borders and there, they can have a very
strong effect on the opinions of the agents who have taken the opposite choice. Instead of
the local opinions tendencies be determined by the local configuration, in this model, an
extreme opinion can actually have a much stronger impact than any others. This causes the
domain walls to shift and, after some time, consensus emerges. However, this is a consensus
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Figure 3. Distribution of the logodd opinions νi after t interactions per agent.
associated with a not warranted level of certainty. Figure 4 shows the average proportion
of agents that agree with the majority as a function of time t, measured as the average
number of interactions per agents. Each point shows the average result of 20 realizations
and the error bars show the standard deviation of the observed values. The tendency towards
consensus as time goes by becomes obvious and, after t = 500, all simulations ended in full
consensus.
When compared with CODA model, we can conclude that it was not the fact that agents
only observed discrete choices that caused the extreme opinions. Observing the strength of
those opinions can have an even stronger effect into the appearance of extreme points of
view. This extremism seems to be associated actually with the problem that the choice is
discrete, between two competing points of view, with no compromise possible.
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Figure 4. Average proportion of agents that agree with the majority as a function of time t,
measured as the average number of interactions per agents. A square lattice with 32x32 agents
was used here.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We saw that Bayesian rules can provide a theoretical basis to model the change in the
opinion of agents in both a more realistic and more flexible way, probably a little closer to
how real people think. The framework does not tell us how people will interact, what the
variables are and how they communicate, but it makes clear that all those are important
parts of the process and allows them to be introduced in any new model. It is up to the
modeler to determine how any system of interest really works and, therefore, the functions
and details of how the framework will be applied. In that sense, it works in a similar way
to Lagrangeans in Mechanics. Which Lagrangean function must be used to describe which
system is a question that must be answered by the scientists working in the field, not by the
formalism. The same happens here.
The introduction of these ideas in a Ising-like scenario, where only binary choices can be
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observed, had made it possible the modeling of the emergence of extremism in a previous
work, in the context of the CODA model. Here, we have also seen how several traditional
models of the literature can be obtained as a limit case of the CODA model. By applying the
same framework to models of continuous opinions, it is possible to understand the Bounded
Confidence models as an approximation to a Bayesian update rule when the agents keep
their uncertainty unchanged. The model developed from those rules is similar, but not
identical, to the Gaussian Bounded Confidence Model38.
It is important to stress once more that the agents in the models are not really Bayesian
agents, so no claim that humans are exactly Bayesians is implied. Once the approximate
interaction rules are found, the agents in the framework follow them in a dumb way. Model-
ing agents with a less limited rationality can be an interesting project and it would easier to
implement with Bayesian rules, but that was not the approach of this paper. On that line, it
should be particularly interesting to investigate extensions of the model using perceptrons,
per example, with the use of Hebbian algorithms39 and work in that line is currently being
conducted40.
What we have is that the Bayesian framework provides a good approach to creating opin-
ion models. It can help creating better, but still simple, interaction rules to be used when
studying social problems. As a framework, it is both a generalization of several traditional
models and something that can be used once first principles of human interactions become
clear. Another interesting aspect is that natural extensions of the model are suggested by
the framework. We have explored extensions as the network of trust and the continuous
communication in discrete choice problems. Other extensions are certainly possible, sim-
ply by making different approximations to a rational decision. And not only opinions can
be modeled that way, but also choices and actions, thus expanding the reach of Opinion
Dynamics.
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